In 2006, Peris-Lopez et al. [1, 2, 3] initiated the design of ultralightweight RFID protocols -with the UMAP family of protocols-involving only simple bitwise logical or arithmetic operations such as bitwise XOR, OR, AND, and addition. This combination of operations was revealed later to be insufficient for security. Then, Chien et al. proposed the SASI protocol [4] with the aim of offering better security, by adding the bitwise rotation to the set of supported operations. The SASI protocol represented a milestone in the design of ultralightweight protocols, although certain attacks have been published against this scheme [5, 6, 7] . In 2008, a new protocol, named Gossamer [8], was proposed that can be considered a further development of both the UMAP family and SASI. Although no attacks have been published against Gossamer, Lee et al. [9] have recently published an alternative scheme that is highly reminiscent of SASI. In this paper, we show that Lee et al.'s scheme fails short of many of its security objectives, being vulnerable to several important attacks like traceability, full disclosure, cloning and desynchronization.
Introduction
In an RFID system, objects are labelled with a tag. Each tag contains a microchip with a certain (generally limited) amount of computational and storage capabilities, and a coupling element. Such devices can be classified according to their memory type and power source. Another relevant parameter is tag price, which creates a broad distinction between high-cost and low-cost RFID tags.
The rule of thumb of gate cost says that every extra 1,000 gates increases chip price by 1 cent [10] .
In [4] , Chien proposed a tag classification mainly based on which were the operations supported on-chip. High-cost tags are divided into two classes: "fullfledged" and "simple". Full-fledged tags support on-board conventional cryptography like symmetric encryption, cryptographic one-way functions and even public key cryptography. Simple tags can support random number generators and one-way hash functions. Likewise, there are two classes for low-cost RFID tags."Lightweight" tags are those whose chip supports a random number generation and simple functions like a Cyclic Redundancy Checksum (CRC), but not cryptographic hash function. "Ultralightweight" tags can only compute simple bitwise operations like XOR, AND, OR, etc.
In this paper we focus in the latter category of ultralightweight tags. These tags represent the greatest challenge in terms of security, due to their expected wide deployment and, at the same time, extremely limited capabilities.
Related Work
In 2006, Peris et al. proposed a family of Ultralightweight Mutual Authentication Protocols (henceforth referred to as the UMAP family of protocols). Chronologically, M 2 AP [1] was the first proposal, followed by EMAP [2] and LMAP [3] . Although some vulnerabilities were discovered (active attacks [11, 12] and later on passive attacks [13, 14] ) which rendered those first proposals insecure, they were an interesting advance in the field of lightweight cryptography for low-cost RFID tags.
In 2007, Hung-Yu Chien published a very interesting ultralightweight authentication protocol providing Strong Authentication and Strong Integrity (SASI) for very low-cost RFID tags [4] . The SASI protocol is highly reminiscent of the UMAP family, and more concretely, of the LMAP protocol. The main difference between these two protocols is the inclusion of the rotation in the set of operations supported by each tag. Indeed, the messages transmitted in to the insecure channel in UMAP family are computed by the composition of triangular-functions (e.g. addition modulo 2 or bitwise OR, etc.) -easily implemented in hardware-which finally results in another triangular-function [15] . A triangular-function has the property that output bits only depend of the leftmost input bits, instead of all input bits. This undesirable characteristic (lack of diffusion) greatly facilitated the analysis of the messages transmitted in the UMAP family of protocols, and thus the work of the cryptanalyst.
SASI represented a considerable advance towards the design of a secure ultralightweight protocol. However, certain important attacks have been published. First, Sun et al. proposed two desynchronization attacks. In [6] , it was proposed a denial-of-service and traceability attack. Then, D'Arco et al. [7] proposed another desynchronization attack and an identity disclosure attack. In [16] , Phan shows how a passive attacker can track tags, violating the location privacy of tags' holder. Finally, Hernandez-Castro et al. [17] recently proposed a full dis-closure attack, but the authors assume modular rotation instead of hamming weight rotation.
In 2008, the Gossamer protocol [8] was proposed as a further development upon both the UMAP family and the SASI protocol. So far, this scheme seems the most secure ultralightweight authentication protocol for low-cost RFID tags, as no attacks have been published. As alternative to Gossamer, Lee et al. recently published a new ultralightweight RFID Protocol with mutual authentication (UMA-RFID in in the following) [9] . The analysis of this recent protocol is the subject of this paper.
Lee et al. Ultralightweight RFID Protocol with Mutual Authentication
Tag, reader and back-end database are the three entities involved in the protocol. Each tag has a static identifier (ID). A pseudonym -dynamic temporary identifier-(IDT ) and a secret key (K) are shared between the tag and the reader. Indeed, the old and the potential new values of the pair {IDT, K} are both kept in the tag to hinder desynchronization attacks. The length of the variables is 128 bits. The channel between the tag and the reader is insecure due to the open nature of the radio channel. In contrast, a secure channel is assumed for the communications between the reader and the back-end database.
Tags are limited to bitwise operations (i.e. bitwise XOR, OR and AND) and left bitwise rotation. Specifically, Rot(A, B) symbolizes that the vector A is subjected to a circular shift of n bit positions, where n is the hamming weight of vector B (i.e. n = hw(B)). Readers are limited to the same set of operations and have the extra capability of random number generation.
We described the messages exchanged in the protocol below (see also Figure  1 ). First, the reader (R) and the tag (T ) are mutually authenticated (authentication phase). Then, the reader and the tag, respectively, update their private information {IDT, K} shared and kept synchronized between them (updating phase).
Authentication Phase
T → R : IDT i In the session i-th, the reader sends a request message to the tag.
Then, the tag backscatters its pseudonym (IDT i ) to provide anonymous identification.
Upon receiving IDT i , the reader looks up in the database the secret key associated to T . Then, it generates a new random value N i and computes the authentication messages A i and B i :
The reader sends {A i , B i } to the tag. 
Reader Tag
, the reader is authenticated. Then, the tag computes the authentication message C i :
Finally, the tag sends C i to the reader.
R:
Upon receiving C i , the reader checks its correctness to authenticate the tag.
Updating Phase
Upon the reader authentication (messages A i , B i ), the tag updates its secret information when message C i is sent. The updating in the reader is conditioned to the valid authentication of the tag (message C i ). Specifically, the updating phase is defined by the equations below:
Security Analysis
In this section, we describe the security vulnerabilities of Lee et al. protocol.
Traceability Attack
Traceability is one of the most important security threats linked to RFID technology. Location privacy is compromised when tags answer readers queries with a constant, static value, something that curiously happens in numerous commercial tags. An encrypted version of the static identifier may be used for privacy protection, but an attacker could still track the tag's holder as the tag keeps on sending a constant value. So it seems necessary to anonymize tags' answers by the inclusion of nonces. However, the simple use of random numbers by itself does not guarantee that a protocol will be resistant to traceability attacks [18] . The traceability problem has attracted a lot of research. In [19] , Juels and Weis give a formal definition of the untraceability model. The same definition, though with a style more similar to that used for security protocols, is described by Phan in his attack against the SASI protocol [16] .
In RFID schemes, tags T and readers R interact in protocol sessions. In general terms, the adversary (A) controls the communications between all the participants and interacts passively or actively with them. Specifically, A can run the following queries:
Execute(R, T , i) query. This models a passive attacker. A eavesdrops on the channel, and gets read access to the exchange of messages between R and T in session i of a genuine protocol execution.
Send(X , Y, M , i) query. This models that the message M sends from X to Y in session i is blocked or altered (e.g. flipping one bit), preventing its correct reception.
Test(i, T 0 , T 1 ) query. This does not model any ability of A, but it is necessary to define the untraceability test. When this query is invoked for session i, a random bit is generated b ∈ {0, 1}. Then, the pseudonym IDT A's success in winning G is equivalent to the success of breaking the untraceability property offered by the protocol. So the advantage of A in distinguishing whether the messages correspond to T 0 or T 1 , is defined as below:
where t is a security parameter (i.e. the bit length of the key shared by the tag and the reader) and r 1 and r 2 are the number of times A can run Execute and Send queries respectively.
} in a game G, offers resistance against traceability if:
ε(.) being some negligible function.
We will show how the UMA-RFID scheme does not guarantee privacy location, being possible to track tags. 
Send(T , R, C T0 n+1 , n + 1) query frustrates the correct reception of message C T0 n+1 in session n + 1, which avoids the updating of the secret key and the pseudonym in the reader. The tag is thus identified using the old pair {IDT In particular, we propose the following procedure to obtain value d:
1. From Equation (8) and (9), the following constant value associated with T 0 is obtained by the adversary:
2. A calculates the XOR between the B T0 n value captured in the learning phase (Equation (8)) and the pseudonym presented in the challenge phase:
3. A utilizes the following simple decision rule:
So the use of random numbers does not prevent in this case the attacker from associating the tags's answers with its holder, with a 100% probability of success.
Full Disclosure, Cloning, and Desynchronization Attacks
The tag and the reader share a secret key. The main purpose of this key is the authentication of both entities. The key is combined with a random number to hamper its acquisition by the attacker when passed over the insecure channel. The above idea is well conceived but the protocol abuses of the usage of Rot(K i , K i ) and Rot(N i , N i ). Indeed, this fact facilitates a sort of linear cryptanalysis of the scheme, despite of the combination of triangular and nontriangular functions.
Theorem 4.2
In the UMA-RFID protocol, a passive attacker, after eavesdropping two consecutive authentication sessions {n, n + 1} between an authentic tag (T ) and a genuine reader (R), can discover the secret key shared by these two entities by simply computing an XOR among some of the public messages transmitted over the radio channel:
Proof We start describing the messages exchanged in sessions {n, n + 1}:
Session n: {IDT n , A n , B n , C n } where
Session n + 1: {IDT n+1 , A n+1 , B n+1 , C n+1 } where
The secret key of the tag in session n + 1 is described by the equation below:
Finally, the attacker can acquire the actual secret key (K n+1 ) of the tag by computing the XOR between the public messages A n , B n and IDT n+1 (see Equations (14) , (15) and (16)):
RFID tags are usually not designed to be tamper resistant, because this will significantly increase their price. An active attacker may tamper with the tag in order to read from or write to its memory in which secret values are stored. Low-cost RFID tags cannot offer protection to this sort of attacks but should be resistant, at least, to passive attacks. We show now how a passive attacker is able to clone a tag after revealing the whole secrets stored in the tag, but without requiring any physical manipulation of it.
Theorem 4.3
In the UMA-RFID protocol, a passive attacker, after eavesdropping two consecutive authentication sessions {n, n + 1} between an authentic tag (T ) and a genuine reader (R), can clone the tag by computing:
Proof From Theorem 2, an adversary can discover the actual secret key of the tag (K n+1 ) after eavesdropping messages {IDT n , A n , B n , C n } exchanged in session n and the dynamic temporary identifier (IDT n+1 ) in session n + 1.
Then, the adversary can obtain the random number associated to the session n + 1 by computing an XOR between the message A n+1 and the key K n+1 . Then, message B can be used to check its correctness.
Once the actual key (K n+1 ) and the random number (N n+1 ) linked to session n + 1 are known by the attacker, the new state can be computed by using these values:
Finally, the attacker can copy the above values to the memory of a blank tag, which results in a cloning attack (having an undistinguishable copy of an authentic tag).
Tags and readers have to remain synchronized to run the protocol successfully. The authors take the extra precaution of storing the old and potential new values of the pair {IDT, K} to fight against desynchronization attacks, but in this case this well-known approach in the literature is not enough. Despite of this countermeasure, an attacker is able to desynchronize a tag and a reader exploiting Theorem 2.
Theorem 4.4
In the UMA-RFID protocol, a passive attacker, after eavesdropping two consecutive authentication sessions {n, n + 1} and performing a manin-the-middle attack between an authentic tag (T ) and a genuine reader (R), can desynchronize these two entities by sending:
Proof Taking advantage of Theorem 2 any adversary, after eavesdropping messages {IDT n , A n , B n , C n } exchanged in session n and the dynamic temporary identifier (IDT n+1 ) of session n+1, gets the actual secret key of the tag (K n+1 ).
Then, the attacker starts the man-in-the-middle attack. Specifically, the attacker intercepts messages {A n+1 , B n+1 } (see Equations (17) and (18)) and sends {A * n+1 , B * n+1 } linked to the random number N * i+1 :
Finally, the attacker intercepts the answer C * n+1 of the tag, and computes the answer C ′ n+1 to the original messages {A n+1 , B n+1 } sent by the genuine reader:
) (38) After the mutual authentication between the tag and the reader, both entities update their internal secret values:
So the adversary deceives the tag and the reader into thinking that the random number associated to the session n + 1 is N * n+1 or N ′ n+1 respectively. As a consequence of this fact, the tag a the reader lose their synchronization after the completion of the updating phase.
To further clarify the attacks previously described, Figures 2(a) and 2(b) illustrate the messages exchanged.
As an easy alternatively to the last attack presented, an adversary can desynchronize tags and readers using the non-resistance of bitwise operations to active attacks [20] . The adversary can reuse old values, transmitted in the channel, to compute new valid authentication messages. Specifically, an XOR operation between the captured value and a constant value properly selected (e.g. A i+1 = A i ⊕ 0x0005) is enough to achieve this objective.
Theorem 4.5 In the UMA-RFID protocol, a passive attacker, after eavesdropping an authentication session n between an authentic tag (T ) and a genuine reader (R), can desynchronize these two entities by sending:
are any constant values whose hamming weight is exactly 2.
Proof First, the reader eavesdrops the messages {IDT n , A n , B n , C n } passed over the channel in session n where
After the mutual authentication, the tag and the reader update their secret values {IDT n+1 , K n+1 }. Indeed the tag stores the old and the potential new values with the objective of preventing desynchronization attacks. However, the adversary may exploit this fact -simulating the incorrect reception of C message and using the old values in a new authentication-provoking a new updating in the tag but not in the reader. Specifically, the adversary follows the experiment described below:
1. Initialization. The adversary randomly selects the C 1 value, with the restriction that its hamming weigh is 2 (i.e. hw(C 1 ) = 2).
Selection of the mask.]
The adversary picks up a C 2 value from the subset of x ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2 L } that satisfies hw(x) = 2, where L is the length of the variables used (i.e. n = 128 in Lee et al. protocol [9] ).
2.1 Authentication. The adversary computes and sends to the legitimate tag the authentication messages:
2.2 Check of C 2 .If the tag accepts {A n+1 , B n+1 } and replies C n+1 to the adversary, it proves the success of the attack launched. Otherwise, the process is repeated from Step 2.0. When messages {A n+1 , B n+1 } are accepted by the genuine tag, the tag sends C n+1 and updates its secret values. However, the reader, which is not involved in the attack, keeps on storing its old values. So the reader and the tag lose their synchronized state and this situation is irreversible.
The remaining question is to know how efficient the attack is. C 1 is restricted to having a hamming weigh of 2 in order for the hamming weigh of N n and N n ⊕ C 1 to be unknown but have a good probability of being equal. As two bits are flipped in N n , and N n is a uniformly distributed random vector, the above condition is satisfied with a probability of 1/2. Finally, the adversary has to test with different values of C 2 . As the adversary does not know the hamming weight of N n ⊕ C 1 , he can not say how many bits C 1 is rotated. However, he knows that the vector resulting from this rotation has a hamming weight of 2, which is quite advantageous. Indeed, the average number of times that the adversary has to try is
Finally, a simple comparison of ultralightweight authentication protocols is shown in Table 1 , where L designates the bit length of variables used.
Conclusions
In this paper, we present the cryptanalysis of Lee et al. protocol, which is one of the most recent RFID mutual authentication protocols in the area of ultralightweight cryptography. The scheme presents noteworthy weaknesses related to most of the security properties initially required in its protocol design. Furthermore, the protocol is an excellent example as how triangular and nontriangular functions have to be combined to design secure ultralightweight protocols, and also about their combined usage does not guarantee any security by itself. 
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